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Abstract 
 
Benchmarking methods, primarily non-parametric techniques such as Data Envelopment 
Analysis, have become well-established and informative tools for economic regulation, in 
particular in energy infrastructure regulation. The axiomatic features of the non-parametric 
methods correspond closely to the procedural and economic criteria for good practice network 
regulation. However, critique has been voiced against the robustness of best-practice regulation in 
presence of uncertainty regarding model specification, data definition and collection. This paper 
investigates the foundation of the critique both conceptually and by describing the actual state-of-
the-art used in energy network regulation using frontier analysis models in Sweden (2000-2003) 
and in Germany (2007-). A principal component of the applied frontier regulation is the 
systematic use of outlier detection models to define homogeneous reference sets and to exclude 
maverick reports. We review two families of outlier detection methods in terms of their function 
and application using a data set from Swedish electricity distribution, illustrating the different 
types of outliers. Finally, the paper concludes on the role of outlier detection as a mean to 
implement regulation with higher robustness. 
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1. Introduction
One of the more prominent applications of state-of-the-art benchmarking is
in the regulation of natural monopolies in general and electricity and gas net-
works, in particular. Benchmarking studies applied to inform such regulation has
considerable economic impact on firms and consumers alike. The theoretical and
intuitive appeal of using best-practice rather than average-practice cost norms
in the regulation is undisputed. Still, economic regulation affecting private and
public firms deploying large investments for essential infrastructure provision to
the society must fulfil the highest criteria with respect to feasibility and regula-
tory robustness. In this paper, we will review some of the critique voiced against
frontier-based regulation. In particular, we will relate the conjectures of various
sources to the actual practice of energy network regulation with respect to the
systematic use of outlier detection techniques. Specifically, we aim at addressing
three research questions: (i) what are the specific requirements for structural and
behavioral robustness in regulatory applications? (ii) what are the effects of us-
ing multi-stage outlier detection, theoretically and in real data sets? (iii) what is
the final impact on regulatory robustness of the application of outlier detection
methods?
The paper makes three contributions to the literature. First, it provides a con-
ceptual view on the importance, specific requirements and classification of outlier
detection and treatment for DEA applications to regulation. Given the prevalence
of such applications in practice and their practical and economic importance, the
paper fills an important gap in the current literature on frontier regulation. Sec-
ond, although there is some scattered work on suggested applications of DEA and
SFA to energy network regulation, there are no scientific papers documenting how
the regulators actually assure robustness in DEA modelling, calculation and inter-
pretation. This paper provides thus empirical evidence that can be used as factual
reference for researchers working with methodological development. Third, the
paper as such provides a response to some of the published critique raised against
frontier analysis applications in regulation. As such, it contributes to the scientific
discourse in general on the role and limitations of Data Envelopment Analysis in
the public sector.
The outline of the paper is as follows: In section 2 we offer a review of frontier
analysis methods and regulatory regimes, followed by the model notation for DEA.
In section 3 we discuss the criteria and challenges of using frontier analysis in
regulatory applications. Section 4 provides a classification of the outlier detection
approaches in statistics and regulatory economics, as well as a review of existing
approaches for outlier detection in DEA. The actual practice in frontier analysis is
documented through the short case studies of the electricity network regulation in
Sweden (2000-2003) in section 5 and in Germany (from 2007) in section 6. Section
2
7 is devoted to a comparative analysis of the outlier detection methods in section
4 applied to real data for the Swedish case. The paper is closed with conclusions
and a final discussion in section 8.
2. Literature review
2.1. Frontier analysis methods
Best practice or frontier analysis methods model the frontier of the technology
and identify a subset of the reference set units to form the peers, the performance
of which is to be emulated by the others. The use of frontier models in regulation
has practical as well as methodological advantages. In practice, the absence of a
priori assumptions on the functional form and the foundation on a limited subset
of identifiable best practice peers, make the frontier methods well adjusted to
judicially implementable incentive regulation. Moreover, the behavioral effects
defining attainable, yet evolving and demanding, performance targets are also well
established in practice.
The frontier is defined as the edge of the empirical production possibility set.
In frontier analysis, each firm is being seen as a decision Making Unit (DMU) which
uses some inputs to produce some outputs, services or goods. The projection of
the individual firm’s position onto the efficient frontier determines the scope and
areas for necessary performance improvements in order to achieve best practice [?
]. The frontier analysis informs both static and dynamic efficiency assessments,
i.e. the incumbent efficiency differences for a given year and the productivity
improvements over time relative to technological progress. Generally, there are two
main approaches for estimating and modelling the frontier; parametric and non-
parametric, as well as two fundamental paradigms related to the data generation
process, i.e. deterministic and stochastic models.
Parametric models are defined a priori except for a finite set of unknown
parameters, estimated from the data. Parametric stochastic models consider the
possible random noise and efficiency distributions in the data. Stochastic Frontier
Analysis (SFA) is a family of methods in this category developed by ? ] and ?
]. Deterministic parametric models do not consider the noise in the data and any
variation in data is considered be information about the shape of the production
possibility set and, by extension, about firm efficiency. Corrected Ordinary Least
Squares (COLS)[? ], estimating a deterministic frontier using OLS is the main
method of this type.
Non-parametric models relax the assumption of a known functional form. Of
more limited attention in the regulation literature concerning stochastic nonpara-
metric models we find the Stochastic Data Envelopment Analysis (SDEA) [? ].
SDEA essentially relaxes the strict inclusion of all observations in the empirical
production set in favour of a ’fuzzy’ stochastic frontier [? ]. A recent addition
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to the family of estimation techniques used for energy regulation came in 2011
for Finland, where the regulator proposed to use the StoNED method [? ? ].
For the deterministic case, finally, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) constructs
a piece-wise linear hull (envelope) around the empirical production set, based on
linear programming. In the following section, we explain the DEA model in detail.
2.2. DEA
Expanding early work in ? ], the name Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and
the popularity of the approach were launched with the classical work in ? ] and ?
]. Below we make a condensed overview over relevant models and notation for our
presentation, for a general description of the various DEA models, see texts such
as ? ] or ? ].
The bearing principle of DEA is to construct a piecewise linear approximation
of the best practice production set T from the observations using linear program-
ming without requiring any imposed functional relationship between inputs and
outputs. Following the convention, the observations are denoted Decision Making
Units (DMU). DEA estimates the technology set T from the observed data on
actual production activities based on the minimal extrapolation principle. The
efficiency measure used in conventional DEA is a radial projection from the DMU
to the efficient (best practice) frontier, either over inputs or outputs. Accordingly,
the efficiency frontier is composed of those DMU classified as fully efficient.
To formalize the above, we assume that each of n DMUs, say DMU i transform
mx controllable inputs x
i and mz non-controllable categorical inputs z
i into my
outputs yi. The prices, if existing, on the controllable inputs are wi ∈ Rmx+ .
We assume that the technological possibilities are the same for all DMUs’ (ex-
cept for the differences captured by the non-controllable variables). Specifically,
these possibilities may be thought of as the set T of feasible input -output combi-
nations
T = {(x, z, y)|(x, z) can produce y} (1)
We shall generally assume that T satisfy
Condition 1. Free disposability: (x, z, y) ∈ T, x′ ≥ x, z′ ≥ z, 0 ≤ y′ ≤ y =⇒
(x′, z′, y′) ∈ T.
Condition 2. Convexity: T is convex.
Condition 3. r returns to scale, (x, z, y) ∈ T =⇒ (qx, z, qy) ∈ T,∀q ∈ K (r) ,where
k = ”crs”, ”drs, ” or ”vrs”, and K(crs) = <0, K (drs) = [0, 1] and K (vrs) = {1},
respectively.
For completeness, let us mention the non-convex model Free Disposability Hull
(FDH) by ? ], in which the only the first condition applies. As highlighted in
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? ] it is important to examine whether the underlying technology exhibits non-
increasing, constant, or non-decreasing returns to scale. We leave the testing
problem for scale returns in this context.
Given n observations of feasible production plans (xi, zi, yi) the technical input-
efficiency for a DMU facing non-controllable inputs z is ETE(x, y, z) : Rmy0 ×Rmz0 ×
Rmx0 → R0 defined as
ETE(x, y, z) = min θ
θ, λ
s.t. θx ≥∑ni=1 λixi
zλi ≥ ziλi
y ≤∑ni=1 λiyi
λ ∈ Γ(r)
(2)
where Γ(crs) = <n0 ,Γ(drs) =
{
λ ∈ <n0 |
∑
i λ
i ≤ 1} ,Γ(vrs) = {λ ∈ <n0 |∑i λi = 1} .
The second constraint effectively sorts the observations using the categoric vari-
able z, [? ]. The radial technical input-efficiency ETE can be interpreted as the
lower bound for the proportion of necessary input θx to achieve the observed out-
put y under conditions z. A DMU is technically input-efficient if and only if the
corresponding score ETE = 1.
The associated underlying cost model for a DMU is given by
C(y|z, w) = min
x
{wx|(x, z, y) ∈ T} (3)
The DEA based cost norm for a DMU facing input costs w and non-controllable
inputs z is thenCDEA(.|., .) : Rmy0 × Rmz0 × Rmx0 → R0 defined as
CDEA(y|z, w) = minwx
x, λ
s.t. x ≥∑ni=1 λixi
zλi ≥ ziλi
y ≤∑ni=1 λiyi
λ ∈ Γ(r)
(4)
where Γ(crs) = <n0 ,Γ(drs) =
{
λ ∈ <n0 |
∑
i λ
i ≤ 1} ,Γ(vrs) = {λ ∈ <n0 |∑i λi = 1}.
The DEA based cost function gives the minimal cost of producing the output for
any output vector given the local factor prices and the local non-controllable con-
ditions. A radial score ECE is easily obtained through
ECE(x, y, z|w) = CDEA(y|z, w)/wx (5)
To develop the setting into a full regulatory model we shall make some behav-
ioral assumptions as well. Assume that the DMU’s actual cost in the planning
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period is the minimal cost C(y|z, w) plus whatever slack s ∈ R0 is introduced in
the production process, i.e.
c (y) = C(y|z, w) + s (6)
Note that production slack is summarized here as an additional cost, i.e., it is
one-dimensional. The DMU (agent) knows C(y|z, w) but the regulator (principal)
does not. She does, however, know the input and outputs in n feasible (historical
or inferred) production plans. Drawing on the information from the n production
plans (xi, zi, yi) the regulator can infer from the minimal extrapolation property
[? ] of the DEA model that
C(y|z, w) ≤ CDEA(y|z, w) ∀y, z, w (7)
The regulator has no more certain information about the cost structure than
that expressed by the cost data collected, we are in a situation of asymmetric
information concerning operating costs and conditions. The objective of the regu-
lator is to induce the DMU to produce an exogenously given demand y at minimal
cost under voluntary participation, as in e.g. ? ].
3. Frontier-based regulation
A number of different regulatory regimes have been applied to regulate natural
monopolies; Rate-of-return regulation [? ], cost-plus regulation [? ], CPI-X rev-
enue caps [? ] and yardstick competition [? ]. The predominant regime during
the first phase of deregulation was to the high-powered regulation such as CPI-X,
e.g. in countries such as England [? ]. ? ] summarize some shortcomings of the
CPI-X model such as the risk of bankruptcy, low cap and the risk of excessive in-
formational rents for a loose cap. The yardstick regime gives some modifications to
address the shortcomings of the CPI-X model while the inability to accommodate
changes in outputs along with lack of dynamics still holds.
In order to guarantee long-term sustainability, a regulation regime should safe-
guard the owners’ interests in investing in the service expansion and improvement,
while simultaneously promoting efficient operation of the sunk assets. The ob-
jective is particularly clear in the regulation of energy network provision, such as
electricity or gas transmission and distribution system operations. The terms in-
centive regulation (EU) or performance based regulation (PBR) are used to describe
an approach where the any cost savings (or overshoot) are partially shared with
the tariff payers. Recently, European countries have used the incentive regulation
combined with advanced cost function estimation for the regulation of electric-
ity and gas networks, both in distribution and transmission. The regulatory cost
norms may be set relative to average or best practice frontier. Due to behavioral
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Table 1: Some European regulation regimes and cost function methodologies for electricity dis-
tributors (DSO) and transmission operators (TSO). Participation in benchmarking at a nat[ional]
or int[ernational] level without direct implementation in regulation is denoted by *.
Country Regime Method DSO Method TSO
Austria Revenue cap DEA(nat) DEA(int)*
Belgium Revenue cap DEA(nat) DEA(int)
Denmark Revenue cap COLS(nat) DEA(int)
Estonia Revenue cap COLS(nat) DEA(int)*
Finland Revenue cap StonED(nat) DEA(int)
France Cost recovery Ad hoc DEA(int)*
Germany Revenue cap DEA-SFA(nat) best-of DEA(int)
Great Britain Revenue cap COLS(nat) DEA(int)*
Greece Cost recovery Ad hoc DEA(int)*
Hungary Price cap Ad hoc Ad hoc
Iceland Revenue cap Neg DEA(int)* DEA(int)
Ireland Price cap Ad hoc Ad hoc
Italy Revenue cap(opex) common X DEA(int)*
Lithuania Cost recovery Ad hoc DEA(int)*
Luxemburg Cost recovery Ad hoc DEA(int)*
Netherlands Yardstick COLS(nat) DEA(int)
Norway Yardstick comp DEA(nat) DEA(int)
Portugal Revenue cap SFA(nat) DEA(int)
Spain Revenue cap Engineering DEA(int)*
Slovenia Price cap DEA(nat) Ad hoc
Sweden Rate-of-return Ad hoc DEA(nat)* DEA(int)*
Switzerland Cost recovery Ad hoc DEA(nat)* Ad hoc
and economical advantages, the latter approach is dominating and the primary
subject of our attention in this paper.
The international review by ? ] shows that some general advantages of DEA
and SFA have led to the introduction of these benchmarking approaches in utility
regulation. Table 1 below gives a summary of the benchmarking methodologies
used for electricity DSOs in 15 European countries [? ] with our updates for the pe-
riod after 2008. Dynamically, the progression seems to be from more heavy-handed
cost recovery regimes, passing through a period of model-based price fixation to-
wards a high-powered market-based yardstick regime.
We see how some countries, like Spain and previously Sweden until 2006, have
chosen to rely on technical engineering norms, sometimes referred to as ideal net-
works, in an attempt to identify not only relative best practice, but absolute tech-
nological possibilities. Most countries rely on some revenue cap model and have
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derived general productivity and individual inefficiencies using benchmarking tools
like DEA and SFA. It is important to note that DEA, in particular for the trans-
mission operations, has a widespread application throughout Europe, primarily
through studies such as e3GRID [? ]. However, as indicated in Table 1 with a star
in the column, many of the countries use DEA to inform regulatory rulings, but
without direct link to the regulation. Nevertheless, the application of DEA is not
without controversy. Therefore, in the following section, we review some of the
the critique raised against the use of frontier-based models as DEA in regulation.
3.1. Robustness
The frontier analysis methods provide sounds empirical estimates for the cost
function C(y|z, w) as to inform regulatory proceedings, including tariff reviews,
monitoring of cost and investment development as well as productivity develop-
ment in the sector. The type of estimates most usually used are cost efficiency
metrics, based on either best-practice (frontier) or quantile/average practice esti-
mates. Since economic regulation is a judicial process that be can challenged in
court if subject to bias or undue process, what matters in practice is not only the
estimation accuracy in expectation but, at least as much, the estimation process.
The objectives for frontier estimates concern both the efficiency model and the
estimation robustness. For the efficiency model to be acceptable, the scope must
be relevant to the data generation process, in particular the absence or presence
of stochastic data as inputs or outputs in relation to the type of model chosen1.
Second, the model scope must adequately reflect multi-output services unless they
are perfectly correlated2. Third, the model specification must assure structural
comparability as to enable the determination of a homogeneous reference set. In
practice, this requirement means that the data collection and variable specifica-
tion should be defined such that it is neutral to different accounting reporting
standards, financial policies and non-regulated businesses.
The robustness of the model specification can be validated by crossvalidation
using alternative specifications and even different methods. In the case the re-
sults are unique to a specific specification, the dependency should be carefully
documented and evidence for the cost causality should be determined.
The robustness of the process implies that identical estimates should be ob-
1E.g., capacity investment and maintenance costs may be correlated to climatic conditions.
Using annual realizations of climatic events in a model is equivalent to transforming it to a
stochastic model. However, the causality with investments is not driven by annual realizations,
but the expected climatic conditions, which can be used in a deterministic model.
2E.g., distribution of electricity at high- and low-voltage levels are two different services.
If only one variable is used, operators with relatively higher/lower incidence of high-voltage to
low-voltage delivery will be penalized/rewarded.
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tainable with different software, analysts and advisors involved. The assumptions
involved in the estimation should be a minimal set of cautiously determined pa-
rameters. The avoidance of technical parameters increases procedural reliability,
i.e. variability due to interpersonal differences in skills, methodological assessment
and non-verifiable assertions. The cautiousness in the parametrization is intrin-
sic in economic regulation since it is imposed on sunk investments that could be
subject to opportunistic hold-up.
Finally, the robustness of the estimation itself relies on the assurance of a rele-
vant reference set consisting of reliable data for structurally comparable operators.
The next section will develop this aspect further by revisiting the critique against
DEA in regulation.
3.2. Critique
The theoretical results by [? ? ? ? ? ] referred to above show that DEA
is optimal in regulation under mild conditions, including asymmetric information
and multi-period regulation. The relatively widespread adoption of the method
in applied utility regulation (cf. ? ] for an application to the German network
regulation) provide evidence about the adequacy of the method to the real condi-
tions in network regulation. Notwithstanding, as any regulatory method based on
restricted discretion (or model-based regulation), the application cannot be made
mechanically and care must be taken at several important steps in the model
development, execution and interpretation.
The main point of criticism against use of the frontier-based models in regula-
tion focuses either to model specification errors or data uncertainty.
Parametric models in general are robust to data errors, but sensitive to errors
in the model specification. On the other hand, non-parametric models are sensitive
to data errors, since they are based on a deterministic framework, but relatively
robust to errors in model specification. The latter strength in terms of absence
of non-verifiable a priori functional assumptions, partly explain the popularity of
the non-parametric techniques in regulation where the endogenous frontier shape
is a judicial strength.
Data errors are common, in particular in new and poorly monitored appli-
cations. ? ] state that poor quality data including incomparable data due to
differing definitions of variables and missing data are the main source of problem
with benchmarking models. ? ] claims that despite the claimed advantage by ? ],
the use of DEA in regulation is a source of dispute and uncertainty. ? ] argues that
any assumption by DEA such as ”Productive inefficiency offers potential for cost
reduction can” can be practically infeasible or any claims by DEA is in practice of
regulation no more than assertions unsupported by analysis or evidence. Further,
? ] adds that any DEA model specification is subjective and may be contradicted
by other, equally plausible models. The choice of variables and model assumptions
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(orientation, return to scale and convexity) and selection of reference sets are two
obvious areas where the regulator can enter subjective preferences into the DEA
model. A distortion in model specification may be unintentional, due to lack of
skills, or intentional, in order to bias the results.
Another criticism against frontier-based models is the uncertainty which can
result from unintentional data errors, inadequate variable specification on data
collection techniques and intentional strategic misreporting of data (maverick re-
porting). In the presence of uncertainty in the data, the frontier’s shape in DEA
could change dramatically since DEA models, by construction, are sensitive to
extreme values and outliers [? ]. This heterogeneity in the reference set can also
cause lack of frontier robustness which critics use to put the frontier- based reg-
ulation into question. The lack of robustness from data sensitivity can be seen in
two perspectives: structural and behavioral.
Lack of robustness from a structural perspective usually comes from three main
causes, cf. ? ]. First, the use of heterogeneous and incompatible technologies
in the same reference set, second, operation at widely different scale in the data
set and third, operation at different scope of activity, part of which may not be
included in the model. All these reasons can make the data gathered from one
firm incomparable to that of others if it uses a different technology, scale or scope.
Models developed based on benchmarking with frontier models such as DEA which
do not consider these differences can potentially put the financial stability and
operating viability of a utility in jeopardy. ? ] notes that without a long history
of standardization, data on regulated networks can be compiled and presented
in different ways that make the comparisons incorrect. Indeed, a major part of
the empirical work in international benchmarking such as ? ] is devoted to data
harmonization and validation.
Lack of robustness from a behavioral perspective can be caused by eithercollusion
or maverick reporting .
One of the main criticisms against benchmarking from a game-theoretic an-
gle is that firms may have strong incentives to manipulate the regulatory process
through collusion. The regulator using a frontier based model is dependent on
information supplied by the firms. Collusion allows firms to behave as merged
entities manipulating the frontier towards which all firms are measured. ? ] states
that when regulated firms realize that they are played out against each other, they
take precautionary measures to collude. Under collusive behavior aggregated data
is correct but disaggregated data is infeasible. Theoretically, this would preclude
any regulation of e.g. the yardstick type. However, the neutralization of the data
collection would require an effective implementation of the collusive agreements.
Collusions are implemented through monetary side payments, repeated contracting
or reputation means. Normally, there is very limited financial interaction among
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Table 2: Sources and intention levels by type of error in frontier-based models in regulation
Source of Strategic intention level
uncertainty Low High
Firm Reporting errors Maverick reporting
Regulator Inadequate variable specification Biased model design
regulated firms, each operating a distinct network for a set of geographically lo-
cated clients. Given that the regulator may audit and challenge any contract
among regulated entities, side payments are difficult to arrange. Thus, none of the
implementation instruments are readily applicable for a regulated utility.
Maverick reporting is the intentional misreporting in order to put the regu-
lation model robustness into the question. In practice, when a new regulation
regime is put in place, it cannot be predicted precisely how it will work. Based
on generally acceptable standards for the quality of policy advice, it is assumed
that the regulation regime is robust [? ], but the regime might not work in the
intended manner under some special circumstances. It is in the interest of some
firms to provoke a ”stress test” for the newly adopted regulatory model. The
idea behind maverick reporting is to purposely produce absurd data in order to
create unrealistic peers and to perturb the regulatory process. After the regula-
tory authority produces its ruling, the maverick firm will retrieve its data claiming
mistakes in the data production procedure. Being based on frontier observation,
the model estimation may have to be completely redone, provoking an instance
of regulatory instability and high direct and indirect regulatory costs. From a
legal perspective, unintentional misreporting is not considered fraud, in particular
when the reporting firm manifests its ”good will” through a submitted correction
of data. Consequently, since the intention behind the reporting in unverifiable in
court, regulatory provisions and penalties for this type of misreporting will not
be enforceable in court. Hence, the possibility of maverick reporting will reduce
the credibility and robustness of the model into question. The more centrally the
maverick is placed, the more operators are affected by it as an incorrect peer.
Table 2 summarizes four possible causes of lack of robustness with respect to
the origin of data uncertainty and the intention of the reporter.
For the regulator, the objective is to minimize the risk of regulatory failure
which is associated with high social and economic costs [? ]. Therefore, within
an experimental framework, the regulatory authority tries to improve the best
practice regulatory regime through a process of continuous improvement. Based
on the criticism explained above, the focus is on those attributes that contribute to
the robustness of the proposed frontier models and to the durability of the process
regulatory regime.
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Whereas regulatory benchmarking provides an effective and systematic basis
of evidence of feasible production under various conditions, the discussion above
shows that the stability of the model and its outcomes must prime on the precision
of the model when using perfect data. This conclusion is a direct consequence of
the regulatory application of frontier analysis and the observation that strategic
action is always an option for firms under any type of regulation.
A principal instrument of frontier regulation to address this dilemma is the
systematic use of outlier detection models to define homogeneous reference sets
and to exclude inconsequential data. In the next section, we review the actual
outlier detection methods used in network regulation in terms of their function
and application in the regulation process, then the criticism against using frontier
models in regulation are addressed. Ultimately, we will explain the role of sys-
tematic outlier detection in structural and behavioral robustness of frontier based
models.
4. Outlier detection
Generally, there is no single definition of an outlier in the literature. We
differentiate here between definitions that focus at the profile of the unit itself,
intrinsic definitions, versus definitions that are based on the influence the unit
exerts in a given estimation, extrinsic definitions.
According to a typical intrinsic definition, cf. ? ], an outlier is an observation
which appears to be inconsistent with the rest of the data set. Inconsistent can
be interpreted in different ways. An common statistical perspective denotes as
outliers observations with extreme values. In the statistical sense, a point which
lies three or four standard deviations from the mean is considered as an ”outlier”.
One of the common reasons is that the observation could contain an error. Such
outlier should ideally be corrected or perhaps be eliminated because it does not
reflect a real production process. Another reason for an observation to be inconsis-
tent with the rest of observations is the use of non-standard tools and procedures
or being from a different data generating process (DGP). ? ] explain that if firms
differ to a large extent from the rest of firms, they end up being badly captured
by the model or having large impact on the model. The introduction of a new
technology into a production process or non-observed environmental changes can
also make a firm incomparable to others. In scientific or prospective analysis, the
detection of profile outliers can be made ad hoc based on e.g. graphs, confidence
intervals for predictions and technological data collected in a second stage. Classi-
cal profile criteria in frontier analysis are based on distance metrics d(θk(T )) where
the estimation depends on the production possibility set T . However, profiling is
problematic in frontier-based regulation for several reasons. First, naturally the
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ad hoc identification of outliers is unacceptable in regulatory procedure. Given
that the outlier is likely to be given a specific treatment, tariff or conditions, the
procedure must be systematic, replicable and justified. Second, a more principal
concern is that a regulatory authority cannot evoke profiling as a reason to exclude
a firm from comparison. As opposed to a statistical estimation for research, where
the analyst may be interested in some average expected relationships, regulation
and taxation apply to all eligible subjects, irrespective of their profile. Excluding
an operator is equivalent to revoking its eligibility, which must be justified by some
other information, e.g. based on technological information or operating standards.
A caveat to the same effect, but based on purely informational argument is found
in the regression analysis literature, e.g. ? ]. Here, upfront rejection of data
based on profiling arguments such as size, mix etc, is not advisable since many
times these observations provide more, not less, information than the bulk of the
sample.
According to an influence perspective, a unit acquires the quality of ”outlier”
for a given method and reference set through the (undue) impact that its inclusion
gives on the quality of the estimation. Note the extrinsic quality of this definition
compared to the previous intrinsic definition. In regression statistics an observation
is considered inconsistent if it is substantially different from all other observations
so that it induces large differences in the results of regression analysis [? ]. With
the statistical definition, an outlier denoted as ”bad leverage” is a point situated
far from the bulk of the points which the regression line crosses, so that it affect the
slope of the regression line and reduce the precision of the regression coefficients.
? ] also define the outlier as an influential observation, which when is removed
from the data set, parameter estimates change dramatically. In regression, the
situation is somewhat more complex in the sense that some outlying points will
have more influence on the regression than others. Standard regression diagnostic
methods such as Cook’s Distance [? ], DFBetas, DFfits, and covariance ratios can
be used to identify the possible influential outliers, see ? ] for a review.
In frontier models especially in DEA, influential points are considered out-
liers if they distort the frontier [? ]. ? ] take the full step out and investigates
”extreme efficient points” in DEA as outliers, without discussing their treatment.
An outlier in a DEA model helps to span the frontier and may have a significant
impact on the evaluation of several other firms. Although we can identify some
isolated data points perturbed by noise as outliers, the outlier concept is differ-
ent from the concept of noise in the data. Therefore, an analyst investigates the
presence of both outliers and influential points because they can affect the DEA
scores and change the whole regulatory procedure. We note here the difference be-
tween the extrinsic criteria when applied to parametric methods (regression) and
non-parametric (DEA). In the former, the status of outlier is independent on the
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relative projection of the firm onto the frontier, opening for the identification of
”inefficient outliers”. In the latter, the mechanism of influence is uniquely passing
through the determination of the frontier, which limits our attention to ”efficient
outliers” (cf. ? ]).
From an applied viewpoint, in particular in regulation, the restriction to effi-
cient peers is attractive and useful for multiple reasons. First, the limited resources
for data validation and auditing can be devoted to cases where potentially some
useful public learning can occur, as opposed to the review of grossly inefficient
firms, amounting to subsidized auditing services for underperformers.
Second, the incentive properties of a regulation in which a radical decrease
in productive efficiency is associated with a positive chance of favorable treat-
ment (i.e. classification as outlier) are poor. On the other hand, it is expected
that claims for extreme productive efficiency would trigger a review to assure the
reproducibility of the event.
4.0.1. Outlier detection methods in DEA
A number of approaches have been proposed in the literature to address out-
liers in DEA, among which the most widely cited are super efficiency, log-ratio
and order-m methods. In the super efficiency ? ] and ? ], an observation which
is significantly pushing out the frontier is considered an outlier. In the log-ratio
method [? ], an outlier is an atypical observation or a data point when removed
from the data, the volume of a defined ”data cloud” decreases more than if we
remove any other observation. ? ] present a technique to classify for a further
analysis those sample observations considerably affecting the measured efficiency
score for the remaining units by checking whether these observations are contami-
nated by data errors or not. Pastor’s technique allows determining when efficiency
changes due to the presence of a given unit in the sample are statistically signifi-
cant. In the Order-m method, ? ] propose a nonparametric estimation that can
be applied in very general settings with multiple inputs and multiple outputs. The
basic concept of Simar’s method is the “expected frontier of order-m”, where m
is a “trimming” parameter of the frontier but also has its own empirical economic
interpretation. In Simar’s method, the estimator does not envelop all the observed
data points so it is more robust to the extreme values. This method is used first as
an exploratory data analysis, before using any frontier estimation. Simar’s results
are based on ? ] concept which proposes a non-parametric estimator, using the
expected minimum input function of order-m. Cazals method is using the DEA
nonparametric envelopment estimators by choosing m appropriately as a function
of the sample size n, the estimator of the frontier, recovers the asymptotic prop-
erties of the FDH estimator. In the order-m method, an outlier is an atypical
observation or a data point which for the different non-parametric estimator of m
has the efficiency score of more than one which signifies that the observation is
14
outlying the cloud of data set. Also, ? ] develop a unified model to identify both
efficient and inefficient outliers in DEA. The measurement of outliers in Chen and
Johnson’s model is relative to a set constructed consistent with a subset of DEA
axioms, ranking the individual outliers based on their influence on the measures.
Given the specific requirements in regulation, i.e. absence of technical param-
eters and outcomes, we focus our attention below to the method used in practice,
super-efficiency filtering, as well as one example of the statistical methods, the
log-ratio method by ? ].
5. Network regulation with DEA: Sweden
The Swedish electricity generation, transmission and distribution sector was
unbundled and deregulated in 1996 following the first European energy market
directive 96/92/EC. An independent regulator was launched, the Swedish Energy
Authority (STEM)3 with the mission to monitor the market and enforce cost
efficient tariffs through an ex post regulation regime. To enforce the policy, STEM
collected a wide range of data from the 245 concession area holders beginning
from 1996. In 2000, two DEA models were developed to inform the regulator in
the monitoring, initially used to provide public reports with easily color-coded
scores (red, yellow, green) available to firms and customers (see e.g. ? ]). Below,
we define these models, partially documented in ? ], relate to the observation of
maverick reporting and summarize the initial provisions for DEA model robustness.
5.0.2. Model specification
The regulator desired to monitor both long-term efficiency using a technical effi-
ciency model and short-term efficiency using a cost efficiency model. The technical
efficiency (TE) model in Figure 1 shows the model specification. The outputs are
total delivered energy (MWh) for low voltage and high voltage, respectively, the
total number of connections for low and high voltage, respectively, and the total
system peakload (MW). The inputs are network capital (SEK), total energy losses
(MWh) and total network length (km) as a proxy for environmental conditions.
The cost efficiency (CE) model in Figure 2 corresponds to a typical cost func-
tion used in regulation, here with total expenditure (TOTEX, SEK) including
depreciation, capital and operating costs, as the single input and the outputs re-
tained from model TE above.
Some descriptive statistics are given in Table 3.
3Name changed in 2005 to Energimarknadsinspektionen, Swedish Energy Markets Inspec-
torate.
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Figure 1: Technical input-efficiency (TE) model, electricity distribution [? ].
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Figure 2: Cost input-efficiency (CE) model, electricity distribution [? ].
5.0.3. Maverick reporting
Naturally, the electricity distributors in 2000 and 2001 had an important effi-
ciency improvement potential, after years of low-powered regulation and passive
owners. The results from the efficiency assessments in 2000 and 2001 in Table 4
confirm earlier results in e.g. ? ] that privately owned operators are more techni-
cally and cost efficient than municipally owned operators. However, it is interesting
to note that the previously state-owned firm Vattenfall stand out. Not only is it
the largest non-public utility in Sweden, facing a privatization and international
expansion, it also appears as inefficient as the municipal firms.
Facing criticism in 2000, Vattenfall opposes the DEA method, the scores and
their publication. The arguments raised by the firm were largely those of consul-
tants as ? ], i.e. the claimed instability and arbitrariness of the scores and the
model. Interestingly, Vattenfall changes the cost allocation among their 37 con-
cession areas, resulting in shifts in controllable operating and total expenditure.
In consequence, the individual scores of the Vattenfall concessions also change, as
well as the identity of the Vattenfall operators on the efficient frontier. It is beyond
17
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Figure 3: Depreciation ratio (depreciation/RAB) for Vattenfall DSO, Sweden, 2000 and 2001.
this paper to review in detail such changes, but the character of the action can be
illustrated using a cost element that normally changes very little; the depreciation
ratio for grid assets. In Figure 3 the concession areas operated by Vattenfall or its
subsidiaries are listed alphabetic order and the depreciation ratios for the years
2000 and 2001 are depicted. Note that several units (e.g. areas 4, 5, 13) change
policy drastically between the two years, with some units showing over 10 per
cent ratio and some units less than 1 per cent. The aggregate depreciation ratio
(5.47% in 2000, 5.68% in 2001) did not change for the Vattenfall group during the
period. At their own request and the outlier review of the regulator, Vattenfall
later corrected the operating cost data (including the allocation of depreciation).
Given the context (an early introduction of DEA, incentives for the operator to
discredit the method), the action could be interpreted as early maverick reporting.
5.1. Robustness implementation
Noting the early experiences with a large number of DMU, varying data quality
and strategic reporting from operators controlling multiple concession areas, the
regulator implemented a simple, yet effective DEA robustness model through the
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”peeling” technique in ? ]4.
The robustness of the DEA assessment is improved if the regulatory ruling is
based on the ordinal classification rather than the exact radial projection, which
is more sensitive to the peer unit data. Given that the initial regulatory model in
Sweden was based on enforced ex post regulation, there was no need to jeopardize
the model by providing too detailed assessments. Consequently, the regulator
calculated the ranking in terms of ”peels” or groups using the following procedure:
1. Set the group number to g = 0
2. Let Ω(g) be the set of all n DMUs
3. Solve ETE or ECE using Ω(g) as reference set.
4. Increment g := g + 1
5. Define Ψ(g) = {i ∈ Ω(g− 1) : E(xi, yi, zi) = 1}, i.e. the set of efficient DMU
in group g
6. Reduce the reference set Ω(g) = Ω(g − 1)−Ψ(g)
7. If Ω(g) 6= ∅ then repeat from Step 3, else stop.
The resulting groups were translated for pedagogical reasons into colorcodes
according to a rule based on the peers in groups 3 and 6, i.e. Ψ(3) and Ψ(6).
A ”green” layer or group was defined as one where all DMUs are efficient with
respect to the DMU in Ψ(3). Likewise, a ”yellow” layer or group is such that all
DMU are efficient with respect to Ψ(6). Remaining layers are classified as ”red”.
An example for 2002 is given in Table 5 below, taken from ? ].
The regulatory logic behind the coloring scheme is essentially an evidence-
based argument for selective monitoring. Unless there are two independent sets of
DSOs dominating a unit, the regulator did not deem the evidence strong enough
to initiate a tariff review, fearing a backlash in case of appeal. However, all yel-
low units have between three and five independent sets of peers that dominate
their performance, which must be considered a plausible robustness irrespective
of potential errors or maverick reporting among the firms. Consequently, these
firms were subject to selective reviews. Finally, for the ”red” firms for which more
than six independent sets of peers could be formed to prove their productive inef-
ficiency, there is an impelling argument for ex post tariff review for all operators
in the class.
4The seminal work on this is reported as [? ]
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Table 5: Efficiency results for Swedish DSO (n = 226), DEA-CE, 2002. [? ], Table 8.
g Color ng Average E
CE(g = 0) ns
1 Green 32 100% 2
2 Green 34 85% 13
3 Yellow 37 75% 6
4 Yellow 28 65% 5
5 Yellow 16 54% 5
6 Red 16 45% 7
7 Red 9 42% 2
Grey 38
Used without outlier detection, the classification would provide a false protec-
tion for firms operating at or reporting odd production profiles in order to achieve
high DEA efficiency estimates. The regulator decided to label firms as ”grey” if
they were measured as fully efficient in a layer, but did not appear in the peer set
for any firm in the reference set. In Table 5 there are 38 self-evaluators. The set
of peers for any group g is partitioned in ng ”colored” units and ns = ‖Ψ(g)‖−ng
self-evaluating or ”grey” units.
6. Network regulation with DEA: Germany
The German regulation is basically a revenue cap regulation. Each regulatory
period is 5 years and the content of the first two regulatory periods have been
detailed, giving the DSO more long-term forecasts on which to act.
It is also a Totex based regulation, i.e., both operating expenses (Opex) and
capital cost expenses (Capex) are subject to regulation. Capital costs are based
on either book values or standardized costs using replacement values and constant
annuity calculations of yearly cost using life times of different asset groups.
The revenue cap of an individual DSO k in the German regulation in year t is
determined by the formula
Rkt = C
k
nc,t + (C
k
tnc(0) + (1− V (t))Ckc (0))(
RPI(t)
RPI(0)
− x(t))ExFa(t) +Q(t) (8)
where Cnc is the cost share that cannot be controlled on a lasting basis (statutory
approval and compensation obligations, concession fees, operating taxes etc.), Ctnc
is the cost share that cannot be controlled on a temporary basis (essentially the
efficient cost level found as the total costs multiplied by the efficiency level, Cc
are the controllable costs, V (t) is a distribution factor for reducing inefficiencies
(initially set to remove incumbent inefficiency after two regulatory periods, i.e., 10
years), RPI(t) is the retail price index in year t, RPI(0) is the retail price index
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in year 0, and x(t) is the general productivity development from year 0 to year
t reflecting the cumulative change in the general sectoral productivity factor for
year t of the particular regulatory period relative to the first year of the regulatory
period. Also, ExFa is an expansion factor reflecting the increase in service provision
in year t compared to year 0 and determined as
ExFakj (t) = 1 +max(
Lkj (t)− Lkj (0)
Lkj (0)
, 0) (9)
where Lj(t) is the volume of load at level j in year t of the particular regulatory
period. The expansion factor for the entire network is the weighted average of all
network levels. Lastly, Q(t) is the increase or decrease in the revenue cap from
quality considerations. Revenue caps may have amounts added to or deducted from
them if operators diverge from required system reliability or efficiency indicators
(quality element). The quality element is left to the discretion of the regulator.
6.1. Robustness implementation
From a benchmarking perspective, the regulation is remarkable for being ex-
plicit with respect to a series of technical aspects such as cost drivers, estimation
techniques, return to scale and outlier criteria.
The Ordinance is specific about a minimal set of cost drivers. Cost drivers such
as connections, areas, circuit length, and peak flow, were obligatory. Of course,
this leaves a series of available alternatives even within these groups and it does
not exclude cost drivers covering other aspects of the service provision.
The German incentive regulation is also explicit as to which estimation tech-
niques to use in benchmarking electricity and gas DSOs and how to combine the
results of multiple models. According to Section 12 of the Ordinance, the efficiency
level for a given DSO is determined as the maximum of four efficiency scores,
EDEA(B), EDEA(S), ESFA(B), and ESFA(S), where EDEA is the Farrell costeffi-
ciency, calculated with a NDRS-DEA model, ESFA is the Farrell cost efficiency,
calculated using a SFA model, and the argument B denotes book value and S
standardized capital costs. As such, the regulation takes a cautious approach and
biases the decision in favor of the DSOs in case of estimation risk. Entities demon-
strating particularly low efficiency are given the minimum level of 60 percent. In
summary, the efficiency of DSO k is calculated using the equation:
max{EkDEA(B), EkDEA(S), EkSFA(B), EkSFA(S), 0.6} (10)
The Ordinance is explicit outlier detection. Indeed, it prescribes two outlier criteria
to be tested for each DSO, and if any of them is fulfilled, the DSO cannot be allowed
to affect the efficiency of the other DSOs. The two criteria can be formalized in
the following ways. Let Ω be the DSOs is the data set, and k ∈ Ω be a potential
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outlier. Also, let, E(h,Ω) be the efficiency of h when Ω is used to estimate the
technology and let E(h,Ω \ k) be the efficiency when DSO k does not enter the
estimation.
The first outlier criterion is that a single DSO should not have too large of
an impact on the average efficiency. We can evaluate the impact on the average
efficiency by considering ∑
h∈Ω\k(E(h,Ω \ k)− 1)2∑
h∈Ω\k(E(h,Ω)− 1)2
(11)
The test compares the average efficiency of the other operators when k cannot
affect the technology as compared to the average efficiency of the other DSOs
when the k is allowed to impact the evaluations. Since E(h,Ω \ k) ≥ E(h,Ω), this
ratio is always less than or equal to 1, and the smaller the ratio is, the larger the
impact of k, i.e., small values of the ratio will be an indication that k is an outlier.
The asymptotic distribution of the ratio is F (|Ω‖ − 1, |Ω‖ − 1), see ? ].
The second outlier criterion is that no DSO k will be extremely super-efficient
in the sense that
E(k,Ω \ k) > q(0.75) + 1.5(q(0.75)− q(0.25)) (12)
where q(a) is the a quantile of the distribution of super-efficiencies, such that e.g.,
q(0.75) is the super-efficiency value, below which exist 75% of DSOs.
In addition to these outlier rules, the ordinance prescribes the use of common
econometric outlier detection methods like Cook’s distance.
7. Outlier detection techniques at work
In this section, we review, operationalize and analyze the outlier detection
techniques used or proposed for identifying outliers in frontier analysis methods in
regulation. To concretely illustrate the properties and comparative performance
for each of these methods, we use an illustrative example of Swedish electricity
distribution system operators for the year 2000, previously discussed. The data
set obtained from the regulator EMI includes a crosssectional dataset of technical
and cost observations for 152 DMU, excluding 20 incomplete observations.
7.1. Super efficiency
What is now called super-efficiency and routinely calculated by most DEA
software was first suggested by ? ]5 as a means to differentiate among frontier
units. The formalization of superefficiency for outlier detection was made in ? ].
5The first mention of the principle for detection of outliers was made in ? ]
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Let T ∗−k be a DEA approximation of the technology based on all observations
but DMUk, i.e.
ESUPER(k) = min θ
θ, λ ∈ Rn−1+
s.t. θxk ≥∑i 6=k λixi
zkλi ≥ ziλi
yk ≤∑i 6=k λiyi
λ ∈ Γ(r)
(13)
Technically, it is simple to set up the associated mathematical programs —
they look just like the usual one except that one column has been eliminated
corresponding to the λk variable.
The super efficiency measures on the input and output sides are not restricted
to be either below or above 1. Indeed, this is part of the motivation for them - wee
need to be able to differentiate among the units with traditional efficiency scores
of 1. The input super efficiency score ESUPER(k) may be larger than 1 with the
interpretation that DMUk could have increased its inputs with a factor ESUPER(k)
and still not have been dominated by an feasible reference unit.
It follows also from the definition that the traditional efficiency measures are
simply aggregates of the super-efficiency measures
E(k) = min{ESUPER(k), 1} (14)
Hence, the super-efficiency measures contains at least the same and sometimes
additional information. It is obvious therefore that they are advantage for decision
making and incentive purposes - at least as long as we ignore information processing
costs.
Definition 1. In the superefficiency method, an outlier is defined as an observation
k such that ESUPER(k) > η for a predefined threshold level η > 0.
7.1.1. Applied example 1
The number of outliers in the superefficiency method is a function of the trim-
ming factor η. Following the German regulation in section 6, we define η by so
that no DSO k will be extremely super-efficient in the sense that
E(k) = (q(0.75) + η(q(0.75)− q(0.25))) (15)
where q(a) is the a quantile of the distribution of super-efficiencies, such that
e.g., q(0.75) is the super-efficiency value, below which exist 75% of DSOs. The
calculation yields η = 1.5. Figure 4 also shows that around η = 1.5 the number
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Figure 4: Number of outliers in the TE model for each trimming criteria
of outliers decreases from 35 outliers to an almost stable level around 10 outliers.
Trimming factors of 1.5 < η < 3 result in a relatively stable set of outliers.
In figure 5, we show the difference between the efficiency score for the non-
outliers before and after outlier removal for the TE − V RS model, fixing η = 1.5
and excluding the resulting 10 outliers from the reference set.
Naturally, Figure 5 confirms the increase in individual scores for the non-
outliers at their removal. However, the average finite6 super efficiency score drops
from an unrealistic 467.4% to a more plausible score of 92.9% whichis around 1
and seems reasonable. .
7.2. Log-Ratio
The Log-ratio method, is a statistical methodology for identifying outliers in de-
terministic non-parametric frontier models by performing various sensitivity anal-
yses or by deleting ostensibly efficient observations until efficiency estimates are
stabilized [? ]. This methodology is useful in identifying observations that may
contain some form of measurement error and thus merit closer scrutiny. When
data checking is costly, log-ratio methodology can rank the observations in terms
6Infinite superefficiency values are excluded from the calculation of averages.
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Figure 5: Difference between super efficiency scores with and without the outliers identified by
the super efficiency method, eta = 1.5
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of their dissimilarity to other observations in the data. It can define a priority for
further inspection of the data set. In the log-ratio method, it is also possible to
extend the definition of outlier in order to remove a group of observations and see
the effects on the log-ratio measure in contrast to the super efficiency method that
we should remove the observations one by one from the data set to see the effects.
The Log-Ratio method is based on a defined data cloud (D) and its volume
[? ].The main idea behind this method is that if we remove a firm from the data,
then the volume of the data cloud decreases. The decrease in the data cloud can
be used as an indication that the firm is an outlier. ? ] defines the volume of the
data set as the determinant of the corresponding input-output matrix,[x, y]. Also,
in order to look for a group of outliers, we can remove more observations and look
at how much the volume of the cloud changes in consequence. One good example
of using Log-ratio method in regulation was carried by ? ] by using this method
for regulation of Brazilian electricity distribution utilities.
To identify the outliers, the Log-ratio method looks for small values of Ri which
is the ratio of cloud of data without the removed firm on the cloud of data with
all the observations. This method finds the smallest R for each number of firms
that could be identified as outliers in the data set. Graphical tools in this method
are used to identify the isolated points as an indication for the number of outliers
that should be deleted from the data set.
Let D(i) be the determinant of matrix consisting the input and output data for
all the firms after removing firm i. R(i) is the ratio between the new volume of the
data cloud and the old volume of the data.
R(i) =
D(i)
D
(16)
By evaluating the changes in R(i), we can also see the consequence of removing
two or more firms from the data cloud. For example; we can use D($) as the
volume for subset [Ω−$], when $ ⊆ Ω. To identify outliers or groups of outliers,
this method looks for smallest values of R for each number of firms that are deleted
from the data set. Along with that, a graphical method is used to plot:(
p, log(
R(p)
R
(p)
min
)
)
(17)
where p is the number of deleted firms. In the graph, the p with isolated low points
gives an indication of p outliers which should be eliminated from the data set.
Definition 2. In log-ratio method, an outlier is defined as a DMU k such that
when it is removed from the data cloud (D), R(k) < η for a predefined threshold
level η > 0.
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Table 6: The p removed observation corresponding to a minimum value of R(p) for TE model
p R
(p)
min
1 94 0.0296
2 32 94 0.0062
3 72 32 94 0.0029
4 125 105 32 94 0.0014
5 125 105 72 32 94 0.00067
6 110 114 88 44 32 94 0.00014
7 110 114 88 44 72 32 94 6,87E+09
8 125 110 105 114 88 44 32 94 3,32E+09
9 125 110 105 114 88 44 72 32 94 1,54E+09
10 125 110 105 114 88 29 44 72 32 94 8,65E+08
11 125 110 60 105 114 88 29 44 72 32 94 4,92E+08
12 125 110 60 105 114 88 42 29 44 72 32 94 2,75E+08
7.2.1. Applied example 2
With applying log-ratio method on our data set, the initial results identifying
the outliers for the TE model are presented in Table 6. The rows in this table
show which deletions give the minimum value of R(p); this minimum value is also
given in the right-most column. Thus, the first row, p = 1, shows that deleting
firm 94 from the data set results in a value of R(p) at 0.0296 and that this value
is the minimum value of R(1) that means the minimum value of R when just one
firm is deleted from the dataset.
Figure 6 shows the number of observations that should be identified as outlier.
We can see that the dashed line peaks at 6 deleted firms(p = 6). Therefore, we
have 6 outliers. From Table 6, we can see that these firms are 94, 32, 44, 88, 114
and 110.
In Figure 7, we show the difference between the efficiency score for the non-
outliers before and after outlier removal for the TE − V RS model. We have
excluded 6 outliers from the data set as they were identified in Figure 6. The
outliers are 5 peers and 1 almost efficient unit (ETE = 97.1%), on average 8 times
larger in terms of number of connections (LV), but 110 times larger in terms of
maximum peakload. Only two of the outliers figure in the peer sets of other units,
17 and 9 times, respectively. We can then conclude that the metric indeed manages
to identify very specific units, but the data-cloud method does not capture the
influence dimension.
Figure 7 confirms a marginal increase in the score for the non-outliers, the
average TE-score goes from 77.47% to 78.39%.
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Figure 6: Number of outliers in mode TE for each trimming criteria
7.3. Comparison of the results of the outlier detection methods
In order to compare the outlier methods and to show how they affect the
DEA results, we have considered the simple DEA model in both CRS and VRS
technology and we compare the average DEA efficiency scores before and after
removal of outliers by different methods. The comparison results are given in
Table 7.
As we see in Table 7, the average efficiency scores increase if we remove the
outliers. As noted, the differences in the average efficiency scores between the
log-ratio method and the full sample are surprisingly low, in spite of removing
six DMUs. However, the internal consistency is low, since there is no common
Table 7: Comparison between average DEA scores after removing the outliers by different meth-
ods
Average TE
Technology All observations Super efficiency Log-ratio
CRS 74.85% 77.07% 74.94%
VRS 78.49% 82.26% 78.72%
Number of outliers identified 10 6
Percentage of outliers 7.9% 4.7%
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Figure 7: Difference in TE scores with and without the outliers identified by Log-ratio method.
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observation identified as outlier in both super efficiency and the log-ratio method
in this example.To relate back to the maverick anecdote in section 5, we note that
no Vattenfall operator was identified as outlier by the log-ratio method.
8. Conclusions
In this paper we have provided some evidence for the robustness of frontier-
based methods for economic regulation. Lack of robustness may be caused by
heterogeneity in the reference set, unintentional data errors, erroneous functional
specification of the production frontier or intentional strategic misreporting of
data (maverick reporting). Outlier detection is shown to be an effective filter for
reference set heterogeneity and unintentional reporting errors, both occurring in
actual examples of European network regulation. In the Critique section, four main
drawbacks of employing frontier-based models in regulation process are explained.
These points can now be addressed one by one through the paper:
First, employing systematic outlier detection is very useful in addressing data
uncertainty which comes from unintentional data errors. In order to minimize
problems due to data errors, a very careful analysis of data along with using multi
stage outlier detection should be done prior to use the regulatory model on the
data set and build the frontier. With identifying and removing exceptional and
inconsistent data, the robustness of regulatory model will increase.
Second, in the regulatory process, firms most establish the appropriate report-
ing formats and standardization of data in order to ensure the regulator in the
quality of data that have been reported. Therefore, the usage of non-standard
tools and procedures can be detected as an outlier and therefore be separated
from rest of the data set in the regulatory process. Multi-stage outlier detection
is useful in achieving robustness in this kind of inconsistent data reporting.
Third, frontier-based models in regulation measure firms against each other
and to the frontier so they can put a lot of restrictions on the side payments. A
massive side transfer may be required from second agent two to the first agent in
order to induce the first agent to truthfully reveal his type. Consequently, firms
would prefer collusive agreement that does not depend on information exchange
that make it hard for the firms to collude.
Forth, strategic misreporting of the maverick type challenges primarily me-
chanic and semi-automatic applications of frontier methods to determine cost
norms. The threat would be most serious early in the life cycle of the regime,
in situations of conflict concerning the model integration in regulation and for
complex data collection. The review of current regulatory practice shows dis-
cretionary and ’soft’ ranking approaches to be used in such situations, e.g. in
transmission system benchmarking and in the introduction of DEA benchmarking
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in Sweden and elsewhere. By refraining from a precipitated use of the method in
tariff regulation, the regulator as well as the firms may gain both confidence in
and information from the model.
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